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iABSTRACT
INVESTIGATION  ON  SOURCES  OF  GROWTH  FOR  TURKEY,
1968-1998
  BAHAR  BAYRAKTAR
M.A. in Economics
Supervisor: Professor Erinc Yeldan
July 2001
The purpose of this thesis is to analytically evaluate the correlations between growth and
selected macroeconomic indicators under the dynamic macroeconomic adjustments of a
globalizing developing economy, Turkey, 1968-1998. First, I illustrate the development
patterns of investment, fiscal, trade and monetary variables under the post-1968 path. Within
the boundaries of this fragile macroeconomic environment, I discuss how much confidence
should one have on the relationship between  various  macroeconomic  indicators and growth.
Next, I present the  sensitivity analysis for basic growth variables, and fiscal, trade and
monetary variables by using a variant of the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). I found that
very few economic indicators are robustly correlated with growth rates or the share of
investment in GDP. Consequently, among the variables which are always  included in the
growth regressions, only human capital indicator is robust. Interestingly, in spite of the
“dramatic” shift against productive sectors, the share of housing investment is positively and
significantly correlated with growth. I found that none of the fiscal and trade indicators that I
studied is robustly correlated with growth or the investment share. My econometric
investigation further suggests that monetary indicators have not provided a statistically robust
impetus on GDP growth.
ii
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE BÜYÜMENİN KAYNAKLARI,
 1968-1998
  BAHAR  BAYRAKTAR
Mastır, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Erinc Yeldan
Temmuz 2001
Bu calışmanın amacı büyüme ve secilmiş makroekonomik göstergeler arasındaki
korelasyonu Türkiye’de 1968-1998 dönemi içinde değerlendirmektir. İlk olarak,
yatırımların, mali, ticaret ve parasal değişkenlerin incelen dönem üzerindeki
gelişmeleri incelenmistir. Bunun üzerine bu ekonomik çatı altında, ceşitli
makroekonomik değişkenlerle büyüme arasındaki ilişkiye ne kadar
güvenebileceğimiz “Sınırların Analizi” yöntemiyle araştırılmıştır ve incelenen
değişkenlerin hemen hemen hepsi kırılgan olarak belirlenmiştir. Büyüme
modellerinde en cok kullanılan değişkenler içinde sadece insan kapitali sağlam
cıkmıştır. Bunun yanında konut yatırımları da pozitif ve anlamlı bir sekilde büyüme
modeline girmistir. Ticaret ve mali politika değişkenleri kırılgan bir yapıya sahip
olmakla beraber aynı zamanda yatırımlara karşı daha duyarlı cıkmışlardır ve
ekonometrik araştırmam para politikası göstergelerinin hem ekonomik büyümeye
hem de yatırımlara karşı kırılgan olduğunu ortaya cıkarmıştır.
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
Developing country economic policy in the 80s focused on structural 
adjustment, a combination of macroeconomic stabilization measures to restore 
domestic and external equilibrium, and structural changes in policies and institution 
designed to make the economy more efficient and flexible, and thereby increase 
growth (World Bank, 1988, 1990a). As the decade progressed, and the consequences 
of macroeconomic disequilibria became clearer, development economists and 
practitioners increasingly accepted the view that broad macroeconomic stability is 
indispensable for sustained growth1. 
The 80s were also the decade in which macroeconomists returned to the study 
of growth theory in the context of development. In addition to this, the new growth 
theory returned to the roles of technology, international trade, human capital, 
economies of scale, and the possible need for a coordinated big investment push to 
break the constraints of low income equilibrium2. In short, during the past decade, 
there has been a tremendous advance in our understanding of economic 
development. On the other hand, the theoretical understanding of economic growth 
has progressed on various fronts, including among other topics of concern, the 
investigation of endogenous technical innovation and increasing returns to scale 
(P.Romer, 1986); the interaction of population, fertility, human capital, and growth; 
international spillovers in technology and capital accumulation; and the role of 
institutions.  
                                                          
1 See Williamson (1990), Fischer and Thomas (1990) and the World Development Report 1991. 
2 See, for example, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1990). 
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On the other hand, with the increasing availability and use of standardized 
data sets there emerged a vast empirical literature on cross-country growth, 
especially following the path-breaking work of Robert Barro (1991)3. Thus, the 
clearest distinction between the growth theory of the 1960s and that of the 1980s and 
1990s is that the recent research pays more attention to empirical implications and to 
the relation between theory and data. The empirical work characterizes the high 
growth countries; for instance, they invest a lot, they have higher school enrollment, 
they are more open. However, Fischer (1991) argued that further studies require a 
switch away from simple cross-sectional regressions to time series studies of 
individual countries. 
  The conflicting claims in this large and growing literature are yet to be sorted 
out, which is understandable given the rapid increase in studies in recent years: for 
example, Romer (1989a), Levine and Renelt (1990), Barro (1991), Hall and Jones 
(1997), Sachs and Warner (1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Durlauf and Quah (1998). 
The literature suggests that authors study different sets of countries, over different 
years, and use different explanatory variables. The great diversity of studies makes it 
difficult both to discern consistent relationships and to compare the results of studies. 
Furthermore, the analytical problems that plague growth regressions make it difficult 
to consider any set of findings reliable. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the basic 
methodology consists of running regressions of the form: 
Y=α+β1x1+β2x2+....+βnxn+∈ (1) 
Where Y is the vector of rates of economic growth, and x1,x2,........,xn are vectors of 
explanatory variables, which vary across researchers. But the main problem faced by 
empirical growth economists is that growth theories are not explicit enough about 
                                                          
3 See, Barro (1989a), Mankiw, D.Romer, D.Weil (1990) and P.Romer (1989a). 
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what variables xj should belong to the “true” regression. That is, even if it is known 
that the “true” model looks like (1), one does not know exactly what particular 
variables xj should be used. If one starts running regressions combining various 
variables, variable x1 will soon be found to be significant when the regression 
includes variables x2 and x3, but it becomes insignificant when x4 is included. Since 
the “true” variables that should be included are not known a priori, one is left with 
the question: what are the variables that are really correlated with growth? Levine 
and Renelt (1992) have provided an initial answer by using extreme bounds analysis 
to identify “robust” empirical relations in the economic growth literature. Sala-i-
Martin (1997) moved away from “extreme test” and wanted to assign some level of 
confidence to each of the variables by looking at the entire distribution of the 
estimators.  
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) presented empirical evidence for a set of 
macroeconomic hypotheses relating to economic growth across a sample of forty 
seven countries. Quah and Durlauf (1998) provided an overview of recent empirical 
research on patterns of cross country growth indicating new empirical regularities 
that differ from earlier ones, e.g., the well known Kaldor stylised facts. However, 
many of these studies are inflicted with the methodological, conceptual and statistical 
problems as indicated by Levine and Renelt (1990), who show that there does not 
exist a strong independent relationship between almost every existing economic 
performance measure and long-run growth. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the analytical findings on the 
correlations between growth and selected macroeconomic indicators under the 
dynamic macroeconomic adjustments of globalizing developing economy, Turkey, 
1968-1998. The main motivation behind this work is the Levine and Renelt’s 
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influential paper which examines whether the conclusions from existing growth 
studies are robust or fragile to small changes in the conditioning information set4. To 
provide evidence on the sensitivity of macroeconomic indicators to small alterations 
in the explanatory variables, I used a variant of EBA (Extreme Bounds Analysis) 
discussed in Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and Leonard (1983).  
The period under analysis is known to span the overall transformation of the 
Turkish economy from domestic demand-oriented import-substitutionist 
industrialization to one with export-orientation and integration with the global 
commodity and financial markets. After following a rather long period of inward 
looking, import substitutionist pattern of growth, Turkey suffered a foreign exchange 
crisis in 1977-1980 which was tackled with the introduction of a structural 
adjustment programme in January, 1980 under the auspices of the international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. The period 1981-1987 was marked 
with commodity trade liberalization and export promotion along with a price reform 
aimed at reducing the state’s role in economic affairs. The existing system of fixed 
exchange rate administration was replaced by a flexible regime of crawling-peg. The 
export orientation phase was driven by commodity trade liberalization and real 
depreciation under conditions of wage suppression. In 1989, capital account 
liberalization was completed with the recognition of full convertibility of the Turkish 
Lira and the elimination of all controls on foreign capital flows and Turkey entered a 
process of short-term foreign capital-led growth associated with mini booms and 
crises throughout the 1990s. In this setting many of the instruments of monetary and 
fiscal control have been transformed, and the constraints of macro equilibrium have 
undergone major structural change (Metin-Ozcan, Voyvoda, Yeldan, 1999). 
                                                          
4 See Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992) “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions”, American Economic Review, 82: 942-963. 
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The paper is organized under five sections: Next section provides a broad 
overview of the development path of the Turkish economy. Section III introduces the 
methodology used in this study, Section IV presents the quantitative results and 
Section V summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
 
6 
CHAPTER II 
II.  Structure of the Turkish Economy 
In this section, I provide a broad overview of the development path of the 
Turkish economy. The story of the Turkish economic development, 1968-1998, has 
not followed a linear and smooth pattern, various turning points alternately resulted 
with development patterns of different characteristics. I portray the 1968-1998 
evolution of the Turkish economy in Table (1). Overall, it is seen that the Turkish 
economy has experienced three distinct cycles of growth crisis-and adjustment under 
the post 1968 path. Hence it is convenient to decompose this path into three major 
sub-periods: (i) import substitutionist industrialization, 1968-1979, (ii) commodity 
trade liberalization and export promotion, 1980-1988; and (iii) post-financial 
liberalization, 1989-1998. I present the determinants of growth corresponding to 
these three sub-periods. 
 
Import Substitutionist Industrialization, 1968-1976 
During the 1960-1978 period, two major and interrelated developments are 
discernible in the expansion of the Turkish economy. One is the impact of five year 
development plans on industrialization and capital accumulation. The other is the 
adoption of import substitutionist industrialization strategy, which is often identified 
as the second phase of import substitution (Cecen, S. Dogruel and F.Dogruel, 1994). 
This period is characterized by the replacement of imported intermediate and capital 
goods, consumer durables and the domestic production of related technologies-by 
domestic production. The main trust of the planning years originated from inward-
looking import substituting program that relied heavily on public investments in both  
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manufacturing and infrastructure through State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). Hence, 
the state was both an investing and producing agent with SEEs serving as the major 
tools for fostering the industrialization targets (Metin-Ozcan, Voyvoda, Yeldan; 
1999).  
With the implementation of the first three five year development plans, the 
economy continued to expand throughout this period, thanks to the unprecedented 
growth in the manufacturing and service sectors. Moreover, for each five year plan 
an overall, growth rate was chosen as the key social target. Given assumptions about 
the productivity of capital, the growth target would imply a particular investment rate 
(Dervis and Petri, 1987). More specifically, the growth rate of real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was 5.8 during the 1968-1976 period.  
In order to investigate the contribution of different factors to economic 
growth, one can decompose the proportional increase in total value added by using a 
neoclassical aggregate-production-function approach5. Based on the aggregate data 
for the 1963-1975 period, the results obtained by Chenery (1986) indicate that more 
than half of the 6.4 percent average annual growth rate of value added was due to 
capital accumulation. On the other hand, technological change accounts for almost 
one-third of the growth rate of output. The contribution of labor growth was a modest 
one, which may seem to be directly related to the emergence of a highly capital 
intensive manufacturing sector in the economy. 
As to the accumulation of capital and investment patterns, one can distinguish 
two subperiods 1963-1979: capital accumulation during the 1963-1973 period relied 
to a large extent on domestic savings, where as under the post-1974 period reliance 
on foreign financial resources increased substantially. With the implementation of 
                                                          
5 See H.D.Chenery, S.Robinson, and M.Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
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the first three five year plans, the proportion of gross fixed investments in GDP rose 
rapidly from 16 percent in 1962 to 27 percent in 1977. The sectoral distribution of 
investments are given in Figure (1). Furthermore, the data on the sectoral distribution 
of investments reveals that the manufacturing sector absorbed the largest portion of 
total investment, followed by the construction, transportation and communication 
sectors. Actually, realized investments on housing and transportation sectors exceed 
the targeted level, and the share of private sector on these activities reached 41.6 
percent due to the expected high profits in housing (Kepenek and Yenturk, 1999). 
Meanwhile, investments in the areas of health and education showed a steady 
decline. Morever, Krueger and Tuncer (1980) found that total factor productivity 
growth in the public manufacturing sector was around 2.65 percent whereas that of 
the private sector was only 1.84 percent. One can therefore argue that, despite their 
chronic deficits and losses, the public sector enabled important contributions to 
productivity growth during these years. 
For the 1970-1976 period, increase in the growth rate of domestic credit stock 
was not able to provide a determined growth path for the economy since the rise in 
credits were not used efficiently in the production areas. It is argued that the main 
reason of using credits in non-production areas is the high inflation rate disturbing 
the profitability of production (Kepenek and Yenturk, 1999). However, the 
distribution of credits was to be mostly arranged by these development plans.  
Another official aim of this period was to increase government revenues by 
raising the taxes. However, the government revenues were not increased as expected 
because of the lack of arrangements in the tax system. Furthermore,  inefficient and 
weak tax structure have placed the tax burden on the wage earners. Hence, on the 
revenue side, fiscal policy was not viable in the sense of reducing income inequality 
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and reserving revenues for attractive use of social resources. One of the most 
important issues in economics is the role of government expenditures and taxation in 
economic growth and there are different growth effects of different types of 
government expenditure. Government expenditures, which include current, transfer 
and investment expenditures, were the direct tool for the implementation of 
development plans, to achieve targeted level of employment, production and price 
level. However, the planned level of public investments was not realized because of 
the problems in financing of the SEEs, which realized 40-45 percent of public 
investments. Financing difficulties in the SEEs emerged since the goods and services 
of the SEEs were priced under their costs, hence, investments of SEEs were not 
completed according to schedule or they were completed years after, with a higher 
cost than initially forecasted. 
The decomposition results of Chenery (1986) also demonstrate that the 
contribution of exports to the growth of GNP was very modest at the beginning of 
the planning period and tended to increase between 1968 to 1973, figure (2). 
Furthermore, the foreign trade regime was heavy protectionist via quantative 
restrictions along with a fixed exchange rate regime which, on the average, was 
overvalued given purchasing parity terms. The average share of exports in GDP was 
3.5 percent during 1968-77 period. In addition to this, it should be mentioned that 
while the 1963-70 period corresponded to a “positive” import substitution, mostly 
financed by domestic savings, the 1971-1977 period can be defined as a “negative” 
import substitution era, which gave rise to increasing current account deficits over 
time6. Thus, these policies became gradually ineffective in promoting the domestic 
production of consumer durables and investment goods. Hence ISI policy was 
                                                          
6 See S.Pamuk (1987) “Ithal Ikamesi, Döviz Darbogazları ve Turkiye: 1947-1979 Krizin Gelisimi ve 
Alternatif Sorunu, 36-38. 
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intensively implemented initially by using workers’ remittances and finally short 
term debts in the period 1970-1977. In spite of high growth rates of GDP, the 
average annual ratio of X/M decreased from 68 percent in 1962-70 to 44 percent  in 
1970-77. On the other hand the average annual ratios of M/GDP increased from 7.1 
percent in 1968-1976 to 8.5 percent in 1977-80. 
The Turkish economy entered the 1970s with rapid growth, a current account 
surplus and a relatively high rate of inflation. In the second part of the 1970s the 
import substitutionist development strategy was observed to reach its limits when 
financing of the balance of payments and industrial investments became difficult. 
Turkey had to resort to short-term foreign borrowing to finance current account 
deficits in the face of falling workers’ remittances and stagnant export proceeds. 
Hence, the foreign exchange crisis of 1977-80 brought together the cessation of the 
civilian democracy and imposition of a new constitution under a military regime. 
Stabilization and adjustment programs were introduced on 24 January 1980, 
under the aegis of the international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. 
The program aimed to curb inflation and alleviate balance of payments difficulties by 
eliminating the excess demand in domestic markets in the short-run and to restore 
equilibrium and economic growth in the long-run7. All of these measures were 
consistent with the spirit of orthodox IMF anti-inflationary measures. In practice, 
contractionary demand policies which depended heavily on monetary targets, 
implied a drastic reduction in the central bank credits extended to the public sector, 
hence a sudden drop in public investments and spending. 
The reduction of inflation from its peak rate of 104 percent in 1980 to 28 
percent in two years; the restoration of positive growth rates; the elimination of 
                                                          
7 See Boratav and Turel (1993), Senses (1994), Celasun and Rodrik (1989), and Celasun (1994) for a 
through overview of the post-1980 Turkish structural adjustment reforms.  
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foreign exchange bottlenecks; and the unprecented growth in exports are numerated 
as the successful results of the 1980 programs. However, as will be examined in the 
rest of this section, the non-conformity between the stated foreign trade objectives 
towards manufacturing exports and the realized patterns of accumulation away from 
manufacturing constituted one of the main structural deficiencies of the export-
oriented growth strategy of the 1980s, which had played a crucial role in the failure 
of maintaining the export promotion programme as a sustainable strategy of 
development (Metin-Ozcan, Voyvada, Yeldan, 1999). This unbalanced structure was 
not able to generate the necessary accumulation patterns for achieving sustained 
growth, that is, all economic indicators of 1988 signal a stagflationary macro 
environment.  
Hence, commodity trade liberalization had reached its limits and the next 
steps would necessarily involve administration of new policies towards liberalization 
of the financial markets and of the full exchange transactions. With full liberalization 
of the capital account and the recognition of full convertibility of the Lira in 1989, 
there has been a massive inflow of short-term capital into the domestic economy, 
flows of hot money (Boratav, Turel, Yeldan, 1996). In this setting, many of the 
macroeconomic indicators have changed. The ready availability of foreign exchange 
enabled the Turkish Lira to appreciate against the major currencies in real terms and 
led to a rapid expansion of import demand. Moreover, it made possible the financing 
of the rapidly growing fiscal deficit of the public sector and also provided relief for 
the increased pressures of aggregate demand on the domestic markets by way of 
cheapening costs of imports8. 
                                                          
8 See Balkan and Yeldan (1998); Selcuk (1997); Boratav, Turel, Yeldan (1996); Ekinci (1998); and 
Yenturk (1999) for an extensive discussion of the post-financial liberalization macroeconomic 
adjustments in Turkey. 
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 The process of financial deepening had nearly matured by 1990. However, 
during the early 1990s, the growth rate of the Turkish economy was substantially 
below the growth path of the earlier decades and fell short of the requirements and 
expectations of an exceptionally mobile, young and dynamic population.  The growth 
rate of GDP was weak in 1988 and 1989, increased to 7.9 percent in 1990 and then to 
1.1 percent in 1991 and fluctuated thereafter. Due to the unsustainable nature of 
fiscal policy and the external deficit, the economy experienced a major crisis in early 
1994, which was followed by real contraction. GDP declined by more than 5 percent 
that year with the inflation rate soaring to 106 percent. Concurrently, the pace of 
capital accumulation, both public and private, contracted. In 1995, GDP had 
recovered and the major trust of the crisis seemed to have been overcome. However, 
as of 1998, the trade deficit was running at US$20 billion; and the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) was  approaching 9.6 percent of GDP. In July 1998, 
another disinflation program was introduced under the guidance of an IMF Staff 
Monitored Program. Although the program achieved some improvements with 
regard to the inflation rate and fiscal imbalances, it could not relieve the pressures on 
the interest rate. The Russian crisis in August 1998, the general elections in April 
1999 and two devastating earthquakes in August and October 1999 deteriorated the 
economic climate severely and several the fiscal balances of the public sector. In the 
rest of this section, I will focus on the development patterns of trade, investment, 
fiscal and monetary policies over the years examined above. 
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The Post-1980 Era and the Determinants of Growth  
Export-Oriented Growth policy 
The export-led growth strategy of the early 1980s was successful in its export 
targets, get failed to achieve a comparable success in investments, capital 
accumulation and in income distribution. More specifically, the average annual 
growth rate of real GDP was 5.3 percent during the 1981-1987 period; but starting in 
1988, the economy entered into a new phase and the growth performance was 
sluggish since then, the real GDP growth was 2.1 percent in 1988. The exemplary 
economy of the 1980s became a textbook case of  “boom-bust” growth performance 
with a relatively lower average growth rate and high volatility in the 1990s. The 
dynamics of the growth performance of the Turkish economy after 1989 can be 
linked to unsuccessful disinflation efforts and debt financing policies of the 
government, pronouncing themselves in the exchange rate policy (Ertugrul and 
Selcuk, 2001). As also witnessed in the Southern Cone experience, such use of 
exchange rate to attain the inflationary targets led to significant fluctuations in the 
real economy and was severely deflationary (Dornbusch 1982; Diaz-Alejandro 
1985).  
Furthermore, the roots of  macroeconomic instability in developing countries 
are both external and internal. Volatility in terms of trade and in financial conditions 
are directly transmitted to small developing countries that are price takers in 
international markets both for goods and services as well as for financial assets. 
Coupled with the inflexibility of domestic macroeconomic instruments and political 
instability resulting in frequent and discrete changes in policy regimes in a weak 
institutional setting, the macroeconomic experience of many developing countries 
have tended to be punctuated by a series of crises. Most importantly, macroeconomic 
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instability has resulted in unstable growth rates of GDP (Agénor and Montiel, 1999). 
Together with the export-oriented growth strategy as a key issue for the post-1980 
period, both internal and external demand conditions; developments in interest rates, 
agricultural support and wage setting policies had the serious roles for an unstable 
growth path (Kepenek and Yenturk, 1999). Considering sectoral growth rates, 
growth rate of industry and services sector were less volatile than the growth rate of 
agricultural sector. 
The period 1981-87 was marked with commodity trade liberalization and 
export promotion along with a price reform aimed at reducing the state’s role in  
economic affairs. After a 33 percent nominal devaluation of the Turkish Lira in 1980, 
a flexible exchange rate regime together with the introduction of a complex system 
of direct export subsidization acted as the main instruments for the promotion of 
exports and pursuit of macroeconomic stability. During the decade, export revenues 
increased at an average annual rate of 15 percent and GDP rose at annual rate of 4.2 
percent in 1981-82 and 6.5 percent between 1983-1987. 
Turkish export performance has been impressive during most of the 1980s. 
Considering the fact that export growth of the 1980s was based predominantly on 
industrial goods, one should look into changes in the degree of competitiveness of 
the manufacturing sector in analyzing the export performance of the Turkish 
economy. Since Turkish manufactured exports compete essentially on the basis of 
prices and not on the basis of product innovation, the main determinants of 
competitiveness are movements (i) in the real exchange rate (including subsidy 
components) for industrial exports, (ii) in real wages, and (iii) in labor productivity 
(Boratav, Turel, Yeldan, 1995). However, the “export-led industrialization” policy 
which has been pursued in Turkey since 1980, has not been a complete success since 
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the rise in exports was not related to new capital formation and improvement in the 
productive capacity of industry between 1980 and 1988. Thus, one can only speak of 
an “increase of exports” which is mostly linked to a shift of industrial capacity 
toward international markets via a siginificant contraction of wages and real 
devaluation (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999; Yenturk 1992).  
Beginning with 1990s, in addition to these structural problems, the real 
appreciation of domestic currency has challenged the policies of export-oriented 
growth strategy. Appreciation of domestic currency deteriorated the competitiveness 
of export-oriented sectors, raising profits and investments in the non export-oriented 
sectors. After 1990 the export import ratio declined rapidly to 58 percent, in 1993 the 
export/import ratio dropped to 53 percent, the current account deficit widened and 
reached US$6.4 billion. The current account balance turned into a surplus in 1994 
due to the severe decline in import demand. After the crisis was overcome, however, 
import demand recovered again, and the current account deficit continued to widen, 
reaching US$ 4.4 billion. What is important to note is that the growth rate of GDP 
parallels rather closely import availability. The years when GDP slows down are 
associated with a decline in the volume of imports and vice-versa. In this sense, the 
availability of imports continued to set the parameters of economic growth in Turkey 
in the post reform period. 
 The post-1980 period can thus be characterized by declining rates of 
investment: from 1981 to 1992 Boratav,Turel and Yeldan (1995) examined the 
accumulation patterns and compared with the pre-crisis, pre-adjustment period. They 
argued that there were two upward spurts in private investments: the first was due to 
the boom in housing investments which attained a 36 percent growth rate during 
1985-1988, and the second was a one year “explosion” in real manufacturing gross 
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fixed capital formation by 64 percent in 1990. As seen from figure (1) share of  
manufacturing in both public and private investment seriously decreased. Actually, 
behavior of agriculture, mining and manufacturing investments always play a key 
role in growth of the economy. However, total investment in agriculture plus mining 
plus manufacturing sectors declined to 25.2 percent in 1997, whereas they were 
around 44 percent in the planning period. It is argued that the dramatic shift against 
the “productive” sectors is what lies behind the decline in potential growth rate in the 
post-1980 era. Boratav, Turel and Yeldan concluded  that without any significant 
improvement in the efficiency of investments, the rate of capital formation is 
significantly lower than that of 15 years ago leading to a lower rate of potential 
growth. The decline in gross fixed capital formation is esentially due to a shortfall in 
public investments which have been depressed by declining rates of public savings. 
Private investment performance had been unable to compensate for the real and 
relative declines of public gross fixed capital accumulation in manufacturing, mining 
and energy sectors. Crowding-out theses of private by public investments are not 
validated in the Turkish case by econometric analysis. Boratav, Turel and Yeldan 
suggests trade offs between private investments in housing versus manufacturing, 
rather than the public/private dichotomy9. As a result, both investment and savings 
rates are lower than the requirements of a dynamic growth process.  
The decline of public sector consumption and investment expenditures were 
clearly visible during the 1994-1995 crisis. Public investment expenditures 
experienced a downward trend, with the 20 percent decline of 1988 not being 
recovered until 1997. Similarly, private investments were not sustained either. The 
                                                          
9 In a recent economeric study on the subject, Akıncı (1993: 45) concludes that “during (1963-1991) 
..., the complementary character of public and private investments prevails over their substitutability. 
For earlier studies in the same vein, see Conway (1990), Uygur(1991) (who also finds tradeoffs 
between private manufacturing and housing investments) and Anand et al. (1990). 
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annual increase in private investment in 1993 to a peak of 35 percent was 
immediately followed by a contraction in 1994 to a low of –9.1 percent. Overall, the 
growth of private capital accumulation was modest and was not able to provide 
sustained invigoration to the economy as a whole. 
 
Private Investment in Housing versus Manufacturing 
During the 1980s, the composition of total fixed investments displayed 
adverse trends at the sectoral level from the point of view of strategic targets. In fact, 
as gross fixed investments of the private sector increased by an average of 14.1% 
annualy during 1983-1987, only a small portion of this amount was directed to 
manufacturing. The growth rate of private manufacturing investments has been on 
the order of half of this figure, at a rate of only 7.7% per annum, and could not reach 
its pre-1980 levels in real terms until the end of 1989. Much of the expansion in 
private manufacturing investments originated from the pull from housing 
investments which expanded  by an annual average of 24.5% during 1983-1987. This 
argument contradicts with the export-led growth strategy since outward-orientation 
strategy was directed to increasing manufacturing exports through significant price 
and subsidy incentives. Moreover, Voyvoda and Yeldan (1999) report that since the 
inception of the structural adjustment reforms and outward-orientation, the 
underlying sources of productivity gains were not significantly altered in the sector. 
They found that none of the leading export sectors of the 1980s could have generated 
sufficiently strong productivity contributions, nor admited strong inter-industry 
linkages to serve as the leading sectors propelling the rest of the economy. The 
                                                                                                                                                                    
housing investments) and Anand et al. (1990). 
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changing patterns of sectoral distribution of investment may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 The adverse impact of financial liberalization on manufacturing investment could 
be observed in the allocation and terms of credit. As credits were diverted to 
short-term uses and to other sectors such as housing, industry was starved of 
investable funds.  
 The failure to get inflation under control meant big nominal changes in interest 
rates and the exchange rate, together with increased uncertainty for 
entrepreneurs, given the unstable political environment. The availability of 
alternative profitable sectors in services as well as the profiteration of new 
financial institutions with higher rates of return in the short-term had an adverse 
impact on manufacturing investment (Senses, 1994). 
 
Hence, parallel to the shift of public investment away from manufacturing toward 
transportation, communication and energy, there was a move in private investment 
toward such sectors as tourism and housing. In short, it seems that an investment 
climate characterized by lack of “innovative, entrepreneurship and modern 
management” and investors’ preference for “short-run financial investment in stocks, 
bonds and other instruments, or deposits with financial institutions, with quick 
returns at the neglect of long-term real investment in plant and equipment” was not 
conducive to growth in manufacturing investment (See Senses, 1990a and 1989a). 
 
Fiscal Policy 
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As indicated above, the export oriented growth policy necessitated a 
reduction in the role of the public sector in the economy, hence, in this period, there 
were structural changes on both the revenue and expenditure side. The former is the 
change in the structure of the taxation system which has been the characteristic 
feature of the period covered and not the changes in the overall tax burden. The latter 
focuses on the domestic debt which soared by about 4 percentage points of GDP 
during 79-92, due to financial deepening under high inflation (Boratav, Turel, 
Yeldan, 1996). Stagnation in tax revenues and increased transfer and current 
spending brought pressures for a downward adjustment of public investments. In 
relative terms, public investments were nearly halved during 1981-92, with a heavy 
incidence on productive sectors. By downsizing the public sector in the real sectors 
of the domestic economy, the developmental role of the state seems to have become 
long forgotten in the Turkish economy of the 1990s (Yeldan, Kose, 1998). 
 Consolidated budget expenditure in GDP had a tendency to fall in the mid 
80s, then it started to rise in the begining of the 90s. However, on the revenue side, 
the same rate of increase was not observed. There has been an overwhelming 
deterioration in the fiscal balances of the state during the post-1990 period. Hence, 
the share of the budget deficit in GDP rose and reached the 8-9 percent in the post-90 
period which was greater than the crisis period in 1977-80. The gap between revenue 
and expenditure in the consolidated budget is the primary deficit, and the gap 
between primary deficit and total deficit rose because of rising interest rates. Briefly, 
it is certain that the main reason for persistent budget deficits has been the 
accumulating debt stock and rising share of interest payments on domestic debt. 
There is no doubt that the outstanding government debt and its composition create  
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not only a financial burden but also have adverse effects on the growth trajectory of 
the Turkish economy in the 1990s. Hence, Turkey ended up with a vicious circle 
which is rolling with the deficit-debt-interest rate puzzle.   
 
Credits and Prices 
During the 1980s the reallocation of credits of the banking system away from 
agriculture and industry but toward construction, housing, transport, tourism and 
domestic trade does not signify a move in response to differentials in social rates of 
returns between sectors (Boratav, Turel, Yeldan, 1996). However, an important event 
emerged in the beginning of 90s, i.e. , the growth rate of credit stock became greater 
than the growth rate of deposits. This revealed the independence of the sources of 
credits from deficits and was financed by borrowing foreign exchange or asset-
backed securities. The most important result is the rising consumption. As it is seen 
from figure (3) except 1989,1991 and 1994, deposit banks growth rate of credit is 
over the growth rate of deposits. 
 Furthermore, it is appropriate to examine the effects of the financial 
liberalization reforms on the credit-financing behavior of the banking system in 
Turkey. This is an important issue if the financial deepening due to the financial 
reforms would have a contribution to the availability of loanable funds in the system, 
leading to an expansion of investments. Conceptually, financial liberalization should 
be associated with an increase in the size of domestic credits advanced to the sector 
as the benefits of financial deepening are materialized. The data reveals that neither 
the financing behavior of the corporate firms nor the banking system as a whole, 
seems to have been affected much by the financial reforms. Moreover, the data on 
the share of private and public sectors use of credits as a share of GNP, indicates a 
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crowding-in type of a relationship between the private and the public’s use of the 
banking sectors credit facilities (Kose, Yeldan, 1998).  
High and variable inflation has been a central feature of the Turkish economy 
since the 1970s. Various stabilization programs implemented over the years have 
brought only temporary relief and inflation remains a major challenge for 
policymakers. Turkey experienced an average annual inflation rate of 20 percent in 
the 1970s, 35-40 percent in the early 1980s, 60-65 percent in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and around 80 percent before the government launched yet another 
disinflationary program. However, the basic elements of disinflation efforts in the 
late 80s were in various forms of nominal anchoring and monetary tightening 
without any serious effort to reduce PSBR. One of the main reasons of the continued 
disequilibrium and persistent inflation rates in Turkish economy has been identified 
as the deterioration in the fiscal balances of the public sector and the resulting 
borrowing requirement (Metin, 1995). 
 
The Role of Population and Education on Economic Growth During the 1968-1998 
period 
Since 1955, the average growth rate of population in Turkey has been 
approximately 2.5 percent. This high and gradually rising growth rate of population 
was due to an increase in birth rates and a decrease in death rates, mainly as a result 
of improved nutrition and the diffusion of health facilities during these years10. In 
spite of the family-planning programs introduced in the five year plans, progress has 
been dismal in the population planning area. 
Although the share of the service sector in total investment has been rising, 
investment in education did not show any significant rise. In 1968 the share of 
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education in investment was 5.6 percent, 2.4 percent in 1978 and since 1988 it was 
around 3 percent. Moreover, the share of the private sector in education rose from 0.4 
in 1968 to 0.9 in 1998. The demand for education in Turkey, both at the primary and 
secondary levels, is rising rapidly as a result of high growth in young population. The 
effect of increasing young population is also felt in the demand for higher education. 
However, as a result of social and economic changes, the education sector suffered in 
quality over the decade. The student–teacher ratio has increased and the qualities of 
the teachers have not improved as suggested by the falling relative scores of teacher 
supplying higher education institutions in the general university entrance exams, and 
diminishing numbers and qualities of those applying for academic carreer in the 
universities (Zehra Kasnakoglu and Erkan Erdil, 1994). Furthermore, there is an ever 
growing demand for private education both as a supplement and as a substitute for 
public schools. The students and their families demand extra education to 
compensate the quality loss that may limit their chidrens’ desires to obtain higher 
education.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 World Bank, Turkey: Prospects and Problems of an Expanding Economy (Washington D.C.: World 
Bank Publication, 1975). 
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CHAPTER III
Methodology and Data
In this section I present the methodology, which is called Extreme Bounds
Analysis (EBA) and the data used in this study. The main motivation behind this work is
the Levine and Renelt’s influential paper called “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross
Country Growth Regressions” to provide evidence on the sensitivity of past findings to
small alterations in the explanatory variables, they used a variant of the EBA discussed
in Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and Herman Leonard (1983). Hence, I first describe
the EBA and then return to study econometric analysis associated with the empirical
growth literature.
Based on the influential work of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), a common
feature growth regression is that the explanatory variables are entered independently and
linearly. Thus, the extreme bounds test works as follows:
Imagine that we have a pool of N variables that have been previously identified
to be related to growth and we are interested in knowing whether variable Z is “robust”
or not. EBA uses equations of the form:
Y=α+βı*I+βz*Z+βx*X+∈
Where Y is either percapita GDP growth or the share of investment in GDP, “I” is a set
of variables that always appear in the regressions, Z is the variable of interest and x∈X
is a subset of variables chosen from a pool of variables identified by past studies as
potentially important explanatory variables of growth.
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EBA, used in the Levine and Renelt paper, involves varying subset of X
variables included in the regression to find the widest range of coefficient estimates on
the variable of interest, Z , that standard hypothesis tests do not reject. As a first step, I
choose a variable that has been the focus of past empirical studies, Z, and run a “base”
regression that includes the only the “I” variables and the variable of interest. Then I
compute the regression results for all possible linear combinations of up to three X
variables and  for each model j, one finds an estimate, βzj, and a standard deviation,σzj .
Thus, the upper extreme bound is defined to be the largest value of βzj plus two standard
deviations, while the lower extreme bound is defined to be lowest value of βzj minus
two standard deviations. The EBA for variable Z says that if one finds a regression for
which the sign of the coefficient βzj changes, or becomes insignificant, then the variable
is not robust. Hence, one might feel less confident in the relationship between Z and Y
variables, because alterations in the conditioning information set change the statistical
inferences that one draws regarding the Z-Y relationship. In this case, I refer to result as
“fragile”.
One possible objection to the EBA approach is that it introduces
multicollinearity, inflates the coefficient standard errors and exaggerates the range on
the coefficient of interest. Leamer (1978 pp.170-181), however, points out that the
multicollinearity problem really reflects a weak data problem. If one is unable to find
robust correlation, this means that there is not enough independent variation in that
variable to explain growth. Only when one identifies a significant correlation while
controlling for other relevant variables, should one have much confidence in the
correlation. Since the growth literature has not adequately identified the causality
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channels, finding a robust correlation certainly does not imply that the variable of
interest causes growth.
To convince as wide an audience as possible that certain partial correlations are
robust or fragile in as meaningful and noncontroversial a manner as possible, as in the
Leamer and Renelt paper, I restrict the EBA in the three ways :
1) I only allow the procedure to choose up to three X variables from the pool of
variables identified as potentially important explanatory variables of growth. Hence,
total number of explanatory variables included in any one regression are set to be
seven or fewer.
2) I limit the EBA by choosing a small pool of variables for X variables. I only search
for five indicators to represent a reasonable conditioning set. Thus, I examine the
sensitivity of the relationship between growth and more variables than that
considered by any other study, thus I restrict X variables to only five.
3) For every variable of interest, Z, I further restrict the pool of variables by excluding
the X variables that might measure the same phenomenon. For example, I do not
allow the inflation rate to be X variable when I examine the relationship between
growth and the rate of domestic credit growth.
Hence, these restrictions make it more difficult to implicate past findings as fragile.
In this study econometric analysis is done by using ordinary least squares (OLS)
and coefficients are estimated by White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors
and Covariance. Furthermore, autocorrelation is checked by Durbin-Watson test
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statistic. There are two dummies for this time period; 1980 and 1994. The annual data
used in this study comes from SIS, State Planning Organization and Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey.
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CHAPTER IV
Econometric Analysis
Now, I turn in this section to the evaluation of the analytical findings on the
correlations between growth and selected macroeconomic indicators for Turkey over
the 1968-1998 period. The section is further linked to four seminal studies of growth
Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-
Martin (1997) and following Robert Barro (1991), the recent emprical literature on
economic growth which has identified a substantial number of variables that are
particularly correlated with the rate of economic growth. Moreover, Levine and
Renelt (1992) examined whether the conclusions from existing studies are robust or
fragile to small changes in the conditioning information set. Thus, in the light of
empirics of the growth literature, I present the sensitivity analysis for basic growth
variables and fiscal, trade and monetary variables for Turkey over the 1968-1998
period.
First, I examine the role of macroeconomic indicators on growth. When the
dependent variable is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, the selected I-
variables consist of the investment share of GDP (INV), high school enrollment rate
(HEC), and the annual rate of population growth (GPO). The I-variables are chosen
based on past empirical studies and economic theory. Of the 41 growth studies
surveyed in Levine and Renelt (1991), 33 include investment share, 29 include
population growth, 13 include a human capital measure, and 18 include a measure of
initial income. Further Sala-i-Martin has collected around 60 variables which have
been found to be significant in at least one regression. In addition, the I-variables are
consistent with a variety of “new” growth models that rely on constant returns to
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reproducible inputs or endogenous technological change (e.g., Barro 1990; Romer
1990a). The underlying problem of establishing causal relationships in economics is
familiar: Does economic prosperity foster financial market innovations, or do
improvements in financial arrangements stimulate economic activity? The list of
such questions is endless. Given the quality of right hand side variables of growth
regressions, the problem of interpreting causal linkages is particularly acute. I agree
with Romer’s (1989a) assertion that growth regressions can only be interpreted
within the context of a theory and that causality only acquires economic content
when we have a theoretical framework for understanding the observed relationship.
While it seems almost self-evident that we need an economic theory to interpret the
statistical relationships in an economically meaningful way, the growth literature to
date has not optimally integrated econometrics with economic theory (Levine and
Renelt, 1991).
There are also problems with including the investment share of GDP as an I-
variable. The causal relationship between GYP (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
and INV is ambiguous, and the variables included in growth regressions may explain
INV. If we include INV, the only channel through which other explanatory variables
can explain growth differentials is the efficiency of resource allocation, thus, to
clarify this ambiguity, I also investigate the correlation between INV and the
macroeconomic variables of primary interest.
The pool of variables from which I typically allow the EBA to choose X-
variables are the ratio of exports to GDP (E), the inflation rate (PI), the growth rate
of domestic credit (GDC), the standard deviation of inflation (STDI), the standard
deviation of domestic credit growth (STDC). I choose these variables to form the
basis of the conditioning information set based on the existing evidence where the
29
literature used these variables, or closely related variables, as fiscal, trade, monetary
indicators. This pool is kept small to make the result more tangible and digestible.
The regression results with the I-variables over the 1968-1998 period are:
GYP= -0.29-3.30GPO+6.83HEC+2.24SHINV
            (2.30)   (1.12)     (8.95)       (1.99)
( The t- statistics are in parentheses, R2=0.85)
The I-variables explain about 85 percent of the variance in growth rates. The
variables have the signs predicted by a wide class of models and all but GPO are
significant at 0.05 significance level. I run this base regression with four different
investment shares: share of total investment (STOTINV), share of public investment
(SHPUB), share of private investment (SHPRV) and share of housing investment
(SHINV) and two different human capital indicators: high school and secondary
school enrollment rates (HEC, SEC). Among the various investment shares, the
share of housing investment is the only one having positive and significant
coefficient,  and both  SEC and HEC have positive and significant coefficients.
Several papers have included various indicators of macroeconomic instability,
finding significant negative effects on investment. Servén (1996) has argued that the
interactions between instability, irreversibility and uncertainty played a significant
role in the poor investment performance in developing countries during the 1980’s
and 1990’s. Rodrik(1990) examined the macroeconomic performance of Turkey in
comparative perspective for the period 1969 to 1986 and in Turkey, the share of
investment in GDP has been consistently lower by two or three percentage points
than in the other countries, except in 1986 which saw a boom in public investment.
Moreover, he found a surprising fact that Turkish recovery has not been
accompanied by a resurgence in investment but all the growth came from exports.
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Furthermore, among the various investment sectors, De Long and Summers (1990)
present evidence that growth is linked primarily to the share of manufacturing
investment in GDP.
Table (2) presents the EBA tests for each of the I-variables. The investment
coefficient is fragile which means variable of interest enters with a wrong sign when
I alter the conditioning set. Moreover, I also examined the differences in βz’s rather
than the differences in β-bounds, the coefficient of housing investment  became
robust. In fact, the distribution of sectoral investments revealed a rising trend for
housing sector, such as the realized investments on housing sector exceed the
targeted level. During the planning period, an overall growth rate was chosen as the
key social target and the five year plans set the guidelines for medium-term macro
balances and sectoral expansions in a mixed economy (Celasun, 1994). Starting in
1980, as a result of export oriented growth policy the tendency of investments were
examined in relation with market conditions and price movements. However, the
declining trend of investments was caused by the inconsistent and unstable market
and price behavior. The post-1980 period can thus be characterized by declining rates
of investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, much of the
expansion in private manufacturing investments originated from the pull from
housing investments. Thus, share of housing investment goes hand in hand with
rising inflation and appreciation of the real exchange rate conforming the data,
Figure (4). In spite of the “dramatic” shift against productive sectors, the share of
housing investment is positively and significantly correlated with growth.
Human capital is another variable, which is always included in the growth
regressions. Given the wide range of countries that researchers typically include in
their data, these indicators are often unsophisticated. For example, as I used in this
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study, high, or secondary school enrolment rates. Life expectancy is also sometimes
included as an indicator of human capital. More advanced measures, such as the
average number of years schooling in the working age population can be developed
if data is available. A major problem with existing measures of human capital is a
failure to account for differences in the quality of education. Attempts to take this
account have been based on using proxies for school input and output quality; for
example, Barro and Lee (1996) use teacher public ratios, per pupil spending and
percentages of students repeating their grade as inputs to a measure of human capital.
Although empirical studies show a positive link between growth and human capital,
this indicator may change sign, in fact may be negative, under different proxies.
A second important finding presented in Table (2) is the robust positive
correlation between GYP and HEC for also SEC, which confirms the finding by
Barro (1991). As a result of high growth in young population, the demand for
education in Turkey is rising rapidly. However, the education sector suffered in
quality over the decade because of social and economic changes. Moreover, public
investments on education do not show any significant rise but there is an ever
growing demand for private education, which, in turn rises the private investment on
education. In spite of the debatable quality of the education system in Turkey, the
coefficient of high school enrollment rate enters with a significantly positive, thus a
robust coefficient.
As illustrated, one should not feel very comfortable assuming that population
growth is negatively associated with per capita growth. For some specifications GPO
enters with a negative coefficient, but it enters with a positive coefficient with other
plausible X-variables. In fact, the coefficient on GPO is insignificantly correlated
with growth in the base regression.
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While the negative relation between population growth and income is obvious from
the data, fully understanding of this relationship is complicated. We have to consider
not only population’s effect on income, but also the determination of population
growth itself.
Table (3) provides the EBA of the I-variables using the investment share as
the dependent variable where none of the I-variables is robustly correlated with INV.
When the result is fragile, the column indicates how many X-variables need to be
added before the variable is insignificant or of the “wrong” sign. This signifies that
the variable of interest, GPO, enters with an insignificant coefficient (or a coefficient
of the wrong sign) in the base regression. Thus, by selectively adding right-hand-side
variables one can find a significant coefficient of the theoretically predicted sign.
From table (3), both human capital indicators are positive and significant for all
shares of investment. The more detailed table showing the relations between
different investment shares and popular growth variables are given in the Table (10).
Consequently, among the variables which are always included in the growth
regressions, only human capital indicator is robust.
Fiscal Policy Indicators
One of the most important and frequently studied issues in economics is the
role of fiscal policy in economic development, hence to link aggregate measures of
fiscal policy with per capita growth rates, most of the empirical studies have tended
to use:
 i. Measures of overall size of the government in the economy,
 ii. Disaggregated measure of government expenditures,
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 iii. Measures of the growth rate of government expenditures, or
 iv. Disaggregate measure of government taxes and the role of government deficits.
Although many of the growth studies have attempted to link aggregate measures of
fiscal policy with growth rates, the literature has not been successful in identifying a
robust empirical relationship between growth and aggregate indicators of
government expenditures or taxes. There are conceptual complexities and statistical
reasons indicating their unsuccessful experience in identifying consistent empirical
relationships between existing measures of fiscal policy and growth. First, the
institution underlying theoretical linkages between fiscal policy and growth is
intuitively appearing and fairly straightforward. Second, studies using separate
components of revenue and expenditure in growth regressions seem to imply that the
effect of fiscal policy on growth depends importantly on what expenditures are
devoted to, and how they are funded. Even putting aside the differential growth
effects of different types of government expenditures and the differential growth
effects of growth types of taxes, there may be complex trade offs between the
beneficial effects of government services and the detrimental effects of distortionary
taxes. In Barro (1990) and Easterly (1990b), growth increases with taxation and low
expenditure level, and then decreases as the distortionary effects of taxation exceed
the beneficial effects of public goods. Government expenditures and growth are
positively correlated when government expenditures are below the optimum amount.
Ram (1986) finds a positive correlation between the growth rate of government
expenditures and output growth. Furthermore, one might find a positive relationship
between the growth rate of government expenditures and output growth even if the
role of government in the economy falls as the country develops. Barro (1989a,
1990, 1991) and Diamond (1989) use detailed measures of government expenditures
34
on capital goods, education, defense and found that consumption spending less
defense and education expenditures to GDP is negatively correlated with growth.
Levine and Renelt (1990), however, show that this negative correlation becomes
insignificant for some econometric specifications. Barro (1991) also finds that the
coefficient on the ratio of government capital expenditure or education expenditures
against growth depends on the specific econometric specification applied. Diamond
(1989) tests for separate effects of a number of categories of public expenditures and
finds that the different categories of government expenditure are quite fragile to the
inclusion of other explanatory variables. As a result, the empirical work on fiscal
policy and economic growth has not produced robust empirical relationships. Barro
(1991), Fischer (1993) as well as Easterly and Rebelo (1993) report the central
government surplus to be a robust variable in growth regressions.
Table (4) reports EBA tests of fiscal variables for the period 1968-1998.
Although the estimated coefficient on government deficit is negative and significant
at 0.10 level, the coefficient is not robust: the coefficient on government deficit
becomes insignificant and positive when I alter the conditioning information set
(e.g., by adding GDC). The ratio of total expenditures to GDP (SHEXPND) is
insignificant in the base regression, the inclusion of other macroeconomic indicators
(e.g., STDC) also induces an insignificant coefficient on SHEXPND.
Table (5) presents EBA tests of the fiscal indicators with INV. Although  the
share of deficit is negatively and significantly correlated with the share of public
investment, combination of different X-variables causes SHDEF to enter
insignificantly and change sign. Thus there is a fragile link between SHPUB and
SHDEF. In the base regression, there is a positive significant relation between
SHEXPND and INV but the coefficient of the variable changes sign as I alter the
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conditioning set (e.g. GDC). Hence, the coefficient of both variables changes sign
with different X–variables. Thus, I end up with positive and significant link between
SHEXPND and SHINV in spite of being fragile. Actually, the rising share of
expenditure in GDP was clearly seen from the data, especially for the post-1989
period.
During the ISI period Turkey did not experience serious budget deficit
problems. But, by the end of 1977, the crisis hit the Turkey with full force when
foreign lending dried up, and the share of deficit rose to 3 percent of GDP. The next
two years was disastrous: growth was negative, inflation moved into triple digits, and
massive shortages developed. During the 1980s, exports became a source of national
pride and proof of international competitiveness, strengthening domestic political
cohesion and foreign financial support. Although export led growth strategy can be
confidently labeled as a success, this was the starting point for the rising share of
deficit in GDP. With the full liberalization of the capital account and the recognition
of full convetibility of the lira in 1989, there has been a massive inflow of short-term
capital into the domestic economy and it made possible the financing of the rapidly
growing fiscal deficit of the public sector. Hence, due to the  unsustainable nature of
the fiscal policy, the economy experienced a major crisis in early 1994. Hence the
rising share of the deficit accompanied the unstable growth path of the economy
during the post-1980 era. Interestingly, the share of expenditure in GDP is not
significantly correlated with growth, however, in spite of being fragile, the share of
expenditure in GDP is significantly correlated with investment in the base regression.
Thus the relationship between SHEXPND and growth may be based on resource
accumulation not necessarily on the improved allocation of resources.
36
Thus, in this subsection, I couldn’t find a robust relationship between a fiscal
policy indicators and growth. Specifically, although there are econometric
specifications that yield significant coefficient estimates between specific fiscal
policy indicators and growth, the coefficients on these variables become insignificant
when the right hand side variables are slightly altered.
These results suggest that the interactions among fiscal policy, investment,
and growth may be more complicated than can be captured in simple linear models
using fairly aggregate measures of fiscal activity.
 International Trade
One of the most important issues in economic growth is the role of
international trade. As in the case of fiscal policy, we have conceptual and statistical
difficulties associated with growth studies that attempt to link trade policy and
growth. First, theory typically analyses the relationship between trade and growth,
focusing on the relationship between exports and growth. Although policy makers
are concerned about the relationship between trade policy and growth, they mostly
examine the correlation between exports and growth. Second, the conclusion of
many growth studies can be easily overturned by slightly altering the list of
explanatory variables.
 Over 200 years ago Adam Smith argued that openness to international
markets could enhance productivity by encouraging specialization that would be
unprofitable in smaller markets. Recently this argument and other theoretical ties
between trade and growth have been formalized by Rivera-Batiz and Ramor (1991),
Grossman & Helpman (1990), and Romer (1986, 1990b). Although theoretical
discussions frequently focus on the relationship between international trade and
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growth, empirical examinations have typically examined the relationship between
exports and growth. Moreover, endogenous growth theory has expanded on the
notion of scale economies, suggesting that trade may increase the generation and
diffusion of knowledge through mechanisms such as: learning by doing, invention
and diffusion of knowledge.
Another weakness with growth regressions that focus on the relationship
between exports and growth is that they generally do not examine specific proxies
for trade policy and yet they tend to draw conclusions concerning trade policy in
general and export promotion policies in particular. This is due to a series of factors:
(1) these studies do not include proxies for trade policy, (2) the causal relationship
between export growth and output growth is ambiguous, (3) all the empirical
relationships obtained by these studies using export growth can be obtained using
import growth or trade growth, and (4) the empirical result obtained by these studies
break down when government spending growth is included (5) the conclusion of
these studies are typically not robust to the inclusion of other policy variables.
Empirically, there is a fairly robust two step empirical link between the share
of exports in GDP and output growth. For a very diverse set of specifications, Romer
(1990b) and Levine and Renelt (1990) demonstrate that the share of exports in GDP
is significantly positively correlated with the ratio of investment expenditures to
GDP and that the investment ratio is significantly positively correlated with per
capita output growth. In Levine and Renelt (1992), the export share is not
significantly correlated with per capita growth where the investment share is
included in the regression, but the investment share remains significantly correlated
with growth where the export share is included, but in particular, these findings do
not tell us anything about export promotion policies. However, it should be stressed
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that it is also possible to think of mechanisms whereby trade may have a negative
influence on growth Grossman and Helpman (1991) cite various examples : (i)
intensified competition due to trade could discourage efforts for invention by
lowering expected potential profitability of a successful invention, (ii) international
competition with a technologically advanced country can bring about a slowdown of
innovation and growth in a country with a disadvantage in research productivity; and
(iii) a country with abundant unskilled labour may be led by trade to specialize in
traditional low tech manufacturing. In this vein, Young (1991) shows that a country
which specialize in goods with greater potential of learning by doing can increase its
growth rate as a result of international trade, while a country having comparative
advantage in goods with less potential of learning by doing can have a slower growth
rate owing to trade. While many empirical studies based on cross country regressions
(e.g., Balassa, 1985; Barro, 1991; and Dollar, 1992) report a positive link between
openness and growth, more recent studies conclude that caution is required when
interpreting earlier results. Furthermore, not all papers find a significant statistical
link between trade and growth. For example; the widely cited Levine and Renelt
(1992) analysis fails to find any of a large number of trade and trade policy indicators
to be robustly correlated with growth especially when the estimated equation
includes investment share. These results are interpreted as indicating that the
relationship between trade and growth may be based on enhanced resource
accumulation, and not necessarily on the improved allocation of resources ( e.g.,
Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996).
The major results for trade variables are presented in tables (6) and (7). The
ratio of exports to GDP (E) is not robustly correlated with growth, in fact, it is not
significant in the base regression. To find a regression in which E enters positively
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and significantly one needs to search beyond the five variables considered as
potential X-variables by the EBA. I also examined the ratio of imports to GDP and as
in the case of E, it is not robustly correlated with growth and it has a positive and
insignificant coefficient in the base regression. Moreover, the relationship between
RER and growth is positive and insignificant, thus, fragile.
Table (7) shows the link between trade variables and investment, although the
share of exports and imports are positive and significant in the base regression, they
are not robustly related with the share of investment; the coefficient on share of
exports (imports) becomes negative when I alter the conditioning information set
(e.g. by adding STDI). The coefficient of RER is negative and significant but it
becomes insignificant and changes sign with different combinations of X-variables.
In short, both the share of exports and imports are positively and significantly
correlated with housing investment; in addition to this RER is negatively and
significantly correlated with the share of housing investment in GDP instead of being
fragile.
In Turkey, trade policy until 1980 was characterized by import-substituting
industrialization under heavy protection. Overvalued exchange rate, quantative
restrictions and a strict system of exchange control were used as the main tools of
trade policy. In the 1980s the most comprehensive and the most radical steps were
taken in the foreign trade sector. Initially they were quite instrumental in promoting
exports and hence alleviating current account deficits. Although the first half of the
80s was a remarkable success from the view point of the balance of payments,
creditworthiness and growth, stable growth path of the economy was not achieved
without any new capital formation and improvement in the industrial productive
capacity between 1980 and 1988. Although, Turkey’s export expansion was based on
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the broad growth of manufactured exports, the necessary improvement in
productivity investments in export manufacturing was not achieved. Hence, by the
end of the decade, the export gains based only on price incentives and subsidies were
exhausted and Turkey faced with exhaustion in 1988 followed by capital account
liberalization. Hence this unbalanced structure of trade policy matched the fragile
relationship between growth and trade variables. Furthermore, these results indicate
that, the relationship between trade and growth may be based on enhanced resource
accumulation and not necessarily on the improved allocation of resources. Since,
although the link between trade variables and growth is fragile and insignificant, the
correlation between trade variables and investment is fragile and significant.
Consequently, although Turkey’s growth performance was determined by
manufactured-export- led-growth, I found positive correlation between trade
variables and housing investment. The results also indicate that the rising share of
housing in GDP corresponded to the real exchange rate appreciation.
Monetary Indicators
Financial instruments and financial institutions  have been integral parts of
economic activity for over two hundred years. Furthermore, since Goldsmith (1969)
documented the relationship between financial system and economic development,
the profession has made important progress. The links between the financial system
and economic growth can be thought as operating through financial and monetary
policy by altering financial structure, but econometrically it is vey difficult to obtain
good measures of financial policy and financial market performance. A number of
researchers examined the role of money in economic activity. Early rational
expectations models by Lucas (1973) and Barro (1976) predicted a neutral
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relationship between anticipated money growth and output. But in recent models,
“high money growth, high inflation” environments can elicit behaviors that reduce
growth. For example, talented agents may transfer out of productive enterprises and
into rent seeking activities, agents may substitute out of simple money exchange and
into transactions technologies that require more time and effort, or capital
accumulation may be discouraged (Stockman, 1981). Hence, money growth could
prevent growth. On the other hand, Tobin (1965) argued a positive influence of
inflation on output due to the fact that inflation increases the opportunity cost of
holding money, thus increasing incentive to invest. However, Temple (1998) pointed
out that the “Tobin Effect” is limited since money balances are only a small fraction
of the capital stock and thus the effect could at best be marginal. Empirical evidence
on the relationship between money, inflation  and growth is ambiguous. Kormendi
and Meguire (1985) concluded that the growth rate of inflation is negatively
correlated with growth, Bruno-Easterly (1998) demonstrate that growth falls sharply
during periods of high inflation (which they define as beind 40 percent or above).
But, Grier and Tullock (1989) found that both the sign and significance  of the
inflation growth correlation depends importantly on the sample chosen. Levine and
Renelt (1992) argued that the relationship between growth and inflation and growth
and domestic credit growth depend on the inclusion of other policy variables.
Although theory suggests that monetary policy variability should impede the
efficient allocation of resources, the empirical relationship betwen monetary policy
uncertainty and growth is ambiguous. For example, Hayek (1944), Friedman (1977)
and Barro (1976) argue that variable inflation or monetary policy uncertainty can
interfere with the ability of agents to extract information from relative prices and
may reduce investment and economic performance. Empirically, Kormendi and
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Meguire (1985) find a negative correlation between the standard deviation of M1
growth and output growth. Grier and Tullock, again find that both the sign and
significance of this correlation depend on the sample of countries chosen; and Levine
and Renelt (1992) demostrate that small changes in the explanatory variables can
change the sign of the coefficient on the standard deviation of inflation or the
standard deviation of domestic credit in growth regressions.
There are two problems with empirical studies: first one is the determining
the direction of causality, for example, per capita output growth and technological
change may elicit the creation and modification of financial arrangements, thus, a
positive relationship between an indicator of financial market activity and growth
may not imply that financial markets cause growth.  The second one is related to the
nature of the time series data. The basic problem in these studies is the separation of
a long-term relationship between output growth from interactions between output
growth and inflation over business cycles.
Hence, this section examines the empirical relationship between growth and
measures of monetary policy for the 1968-1998 period. Each indicator has
conceptual and statistical problems. Nonetheless, the wide assortment of indicators
that I test produces similar results; none of the indicators is robustly correlated with
growth. Moreover, I also examined the differences in βz’s rather than the differences
in β-bounds, the coefficient of PI became robust when the dependent variable is
growth rate of real GDP percapita; STDI also became robust when the dependent
variable is the share of housing investment at 0.10 significance level. The inflation
coefficient is negative and significant in the base regression but it changes sign and
becomes insignificant when I alter the conditioning information set (e.g. by adding
STDC). Both coefficients of STDI and STDC are insignificant in the base regression
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and I can not find a significant relationship with growth by altering the X-variables.
The growth rate of domestic credit stock is positive and significant in the base
regression but it becomes negative and insignificant when I alter the conditioning set
(e.g. by adding STDC), in fact, STDC is positive and insignificantly correlated with
growth, thus fragile.
Table (9) provides the EBA of the monetary variables using the housing
investment share as the dependent variable. PI enters with positive and significant
coefficient when the dependent variable is the share of housing investment but it
changes sign or fails to be significant when I alter the conditioning set. I could find a
robust negative correlation between investment and STDI by altering contioning set.
In fact, the coefficient on GDC is positively and significantly correlated with SHINV
in the base regression but it becomes negative when I run the regression with the
different combinations of the conditioning set, (e.g. by adding STDC).  Moreover,
STDC enters with positive and significant coefficient in spite of being fragile.
As it is indicated in Table (8) and Table (9), among the narrow set of various
monetary variables growth rate of domestic credit is significant to both growth and
investment however, it changes sign or fails to be significant with different set of
variables, thus it is fragile. Following the discussion in section 2 , increase in the
growth rate of domestic credit stock was not able to provide a determined path for
the economy since the rise in credits were not used efficiently in the production areas
for the 1970-76 period. During the 1980s, credits of the banking system were
reallocated  away from agriculture and industry but toward construction, housing and
transportation and in the beginning of 1990s. In spite of being positive and
significant, the coefficient of GDC is not robust when the share of housing
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investment  or  the growth rate of real per capita GDP is chosen as the dependent
variable.
Recent economic history of Turkey is full of examples of aborted adjustment
of seeming success followed by crisis. It is very dangerous to call anything a success
when changes in domestic policy or international events can quickly lead to
reversals. Although Turkey’s macroeconomic performance in the 1980-1985 period
can be labeled as success, inflation was relatively high. Inflation has been a striking
characteristic of the Turkish economy since 1977. Various stabilization programs
implemented over years have brought only temporary relief. Hence, the role of
inflation on economic growth is inevitable.
Before I conclude, I briefly summarized my findings as follows:
 i. I found a positive and robust correlation between the human capital indicator,
that is, high school enrollment rate and growth rate.
 ii. I found a positive and robust correlation between the share of housing
investment in GDP and growth rate; and negative and robust link between
growth and inflation rate; and negative and significant correlation between
standard deviation of inflation and the share of housing investment when I
examined the differences in βz’s rather than the differences in β-bounds.
 iii. I found that none of the fiscal and trade indicators that I studied is robustly
correlated with growth and the investment share. Instead of being fragile,
among the fiscal variables, share of deficit in GDP is negatively and
significantly related with the real per capita growth rate.
 iv. In fact, the relationship between monetary variables and the share of housing
investment is significant, in spite of being fragile. Moreover, among the trade
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variables, real exchange rate is negatively and significantly related with the
share of housing investment and the share of exports and imports in GDP is
positively and significantly related with the housing investment, instead of
being fragile. Among the fiscal variables, share of expenditure in GDP entered
with a positive and significant coefficient to the regression when the dependent
variable is the share of housing investment, in spite of being fragile.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Within the boundaries of this fragile macroeconomic environment, how much
confidence should one have in relationship between various macroeconomic
indicators and growth? This thesis evaluates the robustness of the correlation
between per capita growth rates and selected macroeconomic indicators for Turkey
over the 1968-1998 period. I found that very few economic variables are robustly
correlated with growth rates or the share of investment in GDP. More specifically, I
identified a positive and robust correlation between growth and the human capital
indicator, that is, high school enrollment rate. Furthermore, when I examined the
differences in βz’s rather than the differences in β-bounds, I found positive and
robust correlation between growth and the share of housing investment; negative and
robust link between inflation rate and growth and the relationship between standard
deviation of inflation and the share of housing investment became negative and
robust. Sensitivity results for trade variables (share of imports in GDP, real exchange
rate, share of exports in GDP) and fiscal variables (share of expenditure in GDP)
indicated that the relationship between trade and growth; share of expenditure in
GDP and growth may be based on enhanced resource accumulation and not
necessarily on the improved allocation of resources. Moreover, growth rate of
domestic credit is fragile, that is, it changes sign with the different combinations of
conditioning set, indicating the monetary expansion does not provide a statistically
robust impetus on GDP growth; hence the transformation between money, capital
and production is not achieved. As a result, I could not find any macroeconomic
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indicator, except human capital indicator, robustly correlated with growth or
investment share.
Empirical growth literature suffers from methodological, statistical and
conceptual problems and up to date, growth literature has not optimally integrated
econometrics with economic theory. Moreover, Williams and Kelly (2001) and
Easterly (2001) documented a significant puzzle in empirical growth research: the
former pointed out that the current state of understanding about the causes of
economic growth is fairly poor, hence, many of the variables studied were found to
be fragile or insignificant in growth regressions and the latter demonstrated that
developing country growth should have increased instead of decreased according to
the standard growth regression determinants of growth. Fortunately, Easterly (2001)
argued that academic studies do not have to predict future but only document the
past. Another problem in growth regressions is related to the nature of the time series
data such as separation of a long-term relationship between output growth from
interactions between output growth and selected macroeconomic indicators over
business cycles.
In this respect, a productive area of research would be to focus on the role of
econometrics, such as, capturing the causality and mis-specification problems, on
empirics of growth.
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I.Production and Accumulation (Real Rate of Growth,%)
GDP 5,8 0,5 4,2 6,5 2,1 4,8 -5,5 7,2 2,8
Fixed Investment
         Private 11,5 -5,8 -5,3 12,3 12,6 11,5 -9,1 13,6 -6,7
         Public 11,8 -3,6 0,2 10,3 -20,2 4,3 -34,8 9 30
2.Prices and Credits
Inflation Rate (CPI) 16,3 61 33,2 39,5 75,4 66,4 106,3 84,5 92,6
Domestic Credit Growth 10,2 45,8 42,4 51,5 44,1 73,8 70,5 117,4 48,2
3.Public Finance
As % Share of GDP
Expenditure 16 21 17 17 15 19 22 25 29
Deficit 0,8 3 1 3 3 4 4 6 7
4.Internationalization
As % Share of GDP
          Imports 7,1 8,5 13 16 15,7 14,8 17,8 23,4 22,9
          Exports 3,5 3,3 7,6 10,8 12,7 9,2 13,9 13 13,4
Sources: SPO Main Economic Indicators, CBRT
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Table1. Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment in Turkey, 1968-1998
Table 2
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
INV High: 5,03 1,42 1,52 29 0,87 STDI,GDC
Base: 2,24 1,12 1,99 30 0,87 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,68 1,32 1,48 29 0,86 STDI,E
GPO High: 6,68 5,58 0,8 29 0,87 STDC 
Base: -3,3 2,95 1,12 30 0,87 Fragile*
Low: -14,7 5,24 0,81 29 0,87 STDC,E
HEC High: 11,7 2,38 2,93 29 0,87 STDI
Base: 6,83 0,76 8,95 30 0,87 Robust
Low: 1,56 2,47 2,63 29 0,87 STDI,GDC
Table 3
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
GPO High: 1,64 0,55 0,95 30 0,55 STDI,E
Base: -1,65 0,8 2,04 31 0,27 Fragile(0)
Low: -4,84 1,06 2,53 30 0,32 STDC
HEC High: 1,02 0,2 1,51 30 0,39 GDC,STDC,E Fragile(2)
Base: 0,36 0,06 5,81 31 0,37
Low: -1,16 0,27 2,2 30 0,57 PI , STDI ,STDC
49
underlined variables are  the  minimum additional  variables that make  the  coefficient of 
interest insignificant or change sign.
 
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of in
(Z-variable).  When  the  dependent variable is  the  investment share, no I  variables  are
included. The  high β is  the estimated coefficient  from the regression  with the ext
high bound ( β+2standard deviations); the low β is the coefficient from the regressi
 the extreme  high  bound. The  other  variables are  the  X-variables included in the base 
regression that produce the extreme bounds. The robust/fragile column indicates whether 
the variable of interest is robust or fragile. If  fragile,  the number in paranthesis indicates
that how many additional variables need to be added before the variable is included. The 
Sensitivity Results  for Basic Variables 
regression that produce the extreme bounds.The robust/fragile column indicates whether 
the variable of interest is robust or fragile.* indicates that variable of interest is insignificant
(Dependent Variable: Investment Share)
at  0,05 significance level in the base regression.
extreme  high  bound. The  other  variables  are  the  X-variables  included  in  the  base 
Sensitivity Results  for Basic Variables 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP)
Notes:  The base β is the estimated coefficient from the  regression  with the variabl
interest  (Z-variable) and the always included variables  (I-variables).  The  I variables are 
rate. The  high β  is the estimated coefficient from the regression with  the extreme 
bound (β+2standard deviations); the low β is the coefficient from the regression wit
INV(Investment share of GDP), GPO(Growth in population), HEC(High school enrollment 
Table 4
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
SHDEF High: 0,84 0,59 0,56 29 0,66 STDI,GDC,E
Base: -1,06 0,65 1,61 30 0,51 Fragile(1)
Low: -2,4 0,71 1,37 29 0,53 STDC
SHEXPND High: 1,15 0,52 0,19 29 0,54 STDI,GDC,E
Base: -0,37 0,34 1,09 30 0,49 Fragile*
Low: -1,64 0,58 0,82 29 0,54 STDI,STDC,E
Table 5
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
SHDEF High: 0,72 0,22 1,17 30 0,38 STDI,STDC,E
Base: -0,22 0,08 2,47 31 0,13 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,58 0,19 1,01 31 0,13 GDC,E
SHEXPND High: 0,5 0,11 2,38 30 0,23 STDC
Base: 0,19 0,06 3,11 31 0,21 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,45 0,12 1,61 30 0,64 STDI,GDC,E
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variables  are  the  minimum  additional  variables that  make  the  coefficient  of  interest
Sensitivity Results For Fiscal Variables
(Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Real Per Capita GDP) 
Sensitivity Results For Fiscal Variables
(Dependent Variable: Investment Share)
expenditure share.The other variables are the X variables included in the base regresion
that produce the extreme bounds. The robust/fragile column indicates whether the variable
of interest is robust or fragile. If fragile, the column indicates how many additional variables
need to be added before the variable is insignificant or of the wrong sign. The  underlined
variables are  the  minimum  additional  variables  that  make the  coefficient  of  interest
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of i
(Z-variable). When  the  dependent  variable is  the  investment share, no  I  variables  are
insignificant or change sign. * indicates that variable  of  interest is insignificant at  0,05
the  extreme  high  bound.  Z-variable  definitions: SHDEF= deficit share,  SHEXPND=
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of i
(X-variable)  and  the always included variables (I-variables). The I variables are  INV, GPO 
and HEC.  The high  β is  the estimated coefficient  from the regression  with the ex
high bound ( β+2standard deviations); the low β is the coefficient from the regressi
significance level in the base regression.
insignificant or change sign.
the  extreme  high  bound.  Z-variable  definitions:  SHDEF= deficit share,  SHEXPND=
included. The high  β  is the estimated  coefficient  from the  regression  with the ex
high bound  (β+2standard deviations); the low β is the coefficient from the regressi
expenditure share.The other variables are the X variables included in the base regression 
that produce the extreme bounds. The robust/fragile column indicates whether the variable
of  interest is robust  or  fragile.  If  fragile,  the number in paranthesis  indicates that how
many additional variables need to be added before the variable is included. The underlined
Table 6
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
E High: 2,27 0,63 1,57 29 0,57 STDI,GDC,STDC
Base: 0,03 0,41 0,07 30 0,47 Fragile*
Low: -0,9 0,59 0,48 29 0,56 PI,STDI,STDC
SHIMP High: 1,91 0,66 0,9 29 0,52 STDI
Base: 0,13 0,46 0,28 30 0,47 Fragile*
Low: -0,97 0,55 0,23 29 0,56 PI,STDC
RER High: 0,018 0,007 0,49 29 0,5 STDI
Base: 1E-04 0,044 0,03 30 0,47 Fragile*
Low: -0,013 0,007 0,5 29 0,53 STDI,GDC,STDC
Table 7
M-Variable B SE t N R2 Other Variables Robust/Fragile
E High: 0,34 0,08 1,99 30 0,2 STDC
Base: 0,18 0,05 3,17 31 0,2 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,74 0,1 5,01 30 0,7 STDI,GDC,STDC
SHIMP High: 0,25 0,06 1,84 30 0,18 GDC
Base: 0,12 0,03 3,86 31 0,18 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,59 0,06 6,79 30 0,76 STDI,GDC,STDC
RER High: 0,004 0,001 0,36 30 0,48 GDC, STDC,STDI
Base: -0,004 0,001 3,76 31 0,25 Fragile(0)
Low: -0,203 0,001 0,04 30 0,44 STDI
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regression that produce the extreme bounds. The robust/fragile column indicates whether
Sensitivity Results For Trade Variables
(Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Real Per Capita GDP) 
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of int
(Z-variable) and the always included  variables  (I-variables). The I variables are INV, GPO 
high bound (β+2standard deviations);  the  low β is the coefficient from the regressio
the  extreme  high bound. Z-variable  definitions:  E= Export share,  SHIMP= Import share, 
RER=Real exchange rate.  The  other  variables are the  X -variables  included in the base 
and HEC. The  high  β  is the estimated coefficient from the regression  with the extre
high bound ( β+2standard deviations);  the  low  β is  the  coefficient  from the regre
with  the  extreme high bound.  Z-variable definitions:  E= Export share,  SHIMP= Import
(Dependent Variable: Investment Share)
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of int
(Z-variable).  When  the  dependent  variable  is  the  investment  share,  no I variables are
included. The high β is  the estimated coefficient from  the  regression  with  the  ext
many  additional  variables need to be added  before  the variable is insignificant or of the 
whether the variable of interest is  robust  or  fragile.  If fragile, the column indicates  how 
base regression  that  produce the extreme bounds. The robust/fragile  column indicates 
Sensitivity Results For Trade Variables
insignificant  0,05 significance level in the base regression.
the  variable of interest is robust or fragile. If fragile,  the  number  in paranthesis indicates  
that  how many additional  variables  need to be added before the variable is included.The
underlined  variables are the  minimum additional  variables  that  make the coefficient of
insignificant or change sign.
coefficient of interest  insignificant or change sign.*  indicates  that  variable of interest is 
wrong sign.  The underlined variables are the minimum additional variables that make the
share, RER=Real exchange rate. The other variables are the  X-variables  included in the  
Table 8
M-Variable B SE t N R Other Variables Robust/Fragile
PI High: 0,04 0,07 1,53 29 0,56 STDI,STDC,E
Base: -0,14 0,06 2,09 30 0,53 Fragile(0)
Low: -0,28 0,07 2,08 30 0,53 E
STDI High: 2,82 0,81 1,44 29 0,57 GDC,STDC,E
Base: 0,08 0,38 0,22 29 0,5 Fragile*
Low: -1,08 0,77 0,6 29 0,56 PI,STDC,E
GDC High: 0,23 0,06 1,72 29 0,57 STDC,STDI,E
Base: 0,07 0,03 1,94 30 0,52 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,06 0,06 0,86 29 0,52 STDI,STDC
STDC High: 1,44 0,45 1,19 29 0,57 STDI,GDC,E
Base: 0,12 0,26 0,48 29 0,5 Fragile*
Low: -0,65 0,4 0,37 29 0,58 PI,STDI,GDC
Table 9
M-Variable B SE t N R Other Variables Robust/Fragile
PI High: 0,08 0,01 3,78 30 0,48 STDC,E
Base: 0,04 0,007 6,5 31 0,47 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,04 0,02 0,03 30 0,63 STDI,STDC,E
STDI High: 0,05 0,06 1,24 30 0,49 PI,GDC
Base: -0,12 0,02 4,47 30 0,22 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,66 0,07 7,18 30 0,7 GDC,STDC,E
GDC High: 0,065 0,01 2,01 30 0,33 STDC,E
Base: 0,033 0,006 4,91 31 0,32 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,066 0,01 2,49 30 0,7 STDI,STDC,E
STDC High: 0,15 0,05 0,76 30 0,2 E
Base: 0,09 0,03 2,38 30 0,09 Fragile(1)
Low: -0,27 0,04 3,73 30 0,7 STDI,GDC,E
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base  regression  that  produce the extreme bounds .The robust/fragile column indicates 
deviation of rate  of  inflation;  GDC=Growth  rate  of  domestic  credit;  STDD=Standard 
deviation of domestic credit growth.The other variables are the X-variables included in the
whether  the  variable of interest is robust or fragile.  If  fragile, the number in paranthesis
indicates how many additional variables need to be added before the variable is included.
The  underlined  variables are the minimum additional variables that make the coefficient
Sensitivity Results For Monetary Variables
(Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Real Per Capita GDP) 
deviation  of  domestic credit growth. The  other  variables are the X-variables included in 
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of in
(Z-variable) and  the  always included  variables (I-variables). The I variables are INV, GPO 
at 0,05 significance level in the base regression.
is insignificant at 0,05 significancelevel in the base regression.
how  many additional  variables need to be added before the variable is insignificant or of 
 the coefficient of interest insignificant or change sign.*  indicates that variable of interest 
the wrong sign. The  underlined variables are the minimum additional variables that make
included. The  high  β is  the  estimated coefficient  from the regression  with the ex
(Dependent Variable: Investment Share)
(Z-variable). When  the  dependent  variable  is  the  investment  share,  no I variables are
Notes: The base β is estimated coefficient from the regression with the variable of in
Sensitivity Results For Monetary Variables
and HEC.  The high β is  the  estimated coefficient from the regression with  the  ext
high bound ( β+2standard deviations);  the  low  β  is  the coefficient  from the  regr
of interest insignificant or change sign.*  indicates that variable of interest is insignificant 
with  the  extreme  high  bound.  Z-variable definitions:  PI=Inflation rate;  STDI=Standard 
deviation of  rate  of  inflation;  GDC=Growth  rate  of  domestic  credit;  STDD=Standard 
whether  the  variable of interest is robust  or  fragile. If fragile, the  column indicates that
the base regression that produce the extreme bounds.The robust/fragile column indicates
with  the  extreme high bound.  Z-variable  definitions:  PI=Inflation rate;  STDI=Standard 
high  bound (β+2standard deviations);  the  low  β  is  the coefficient from  the  regr
Table 10
SHINV STOTINV SHPUB SHPRV
HEC PS PS PS PS
SHDEF PS PS NS PS
SHEXPND PS PS NS PS
E PS NI NI PS
SHIMP PS PS NI PS
RER NS NS NI NS
PI PS PS NI PS
STDI NS NS PS NS
GDC PS PS   NS* PS
STDC PS PS  NS PS
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significance level.
Share of Investment and Popular Growth Variables
Notes:  PS= Positive, significant, NS= Negative, significant
PI= Positive, insignificant, NI= Negative, insignificant. HEC=
credit growth.* indicates that the variable is significant at 0,10
rate of domestic credit,STDC= Standard deviation of domestic
deficit,  SHEXPND= Share of government  expenditure,  E= 
High school enrollment rate, SHDEF= Share of government
Share of exports, SHIMP= Share of imports,PI= Inflation rate,
STDI= Standard deviation of  rate  of inflation, GDC= Growth 
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Figure 1
Source: Main Economic Indicators
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Source: SIS
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Source: CBRT
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Source: SPO Main Economic Indicators, CBRT
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